Quantum McEliece public-key encryption scheme by Yang, Li & Liang, Min
ar
X
iv
:1
50
1.
04
89
5v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
19
 Ja
n 2
01
5
Quantum McEliece public-key encryption scheme
Li Yanga, Min Liangb
aState Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
bData Communication Science and Technology Research Institute, Beijing 100191, China
Abstract
This paper investigates a quantum version of McEliece public-key encryption
(PKE) scheme, and analyzes its security. As is well known, the security
of classical McEliece PKE is not stronger than the onewayness of related
classical one-way function. We prove the security of quantum McEliece PKE
ranks between them. Moreover, we propose the double-encryption technique
to improve its security, and the security of the improved scheme is proved to
be between the original scheme and the quantum one-time pad.
Keywords: Cryptology of quantum information, quantum public-key
encryption, one-way quantum transformation, McEliece public-key
encryption, NP-complete problem
1. Introduction
Public-key encryption (PKE) is one of the most important research direc-
tions in modern cryptography, and has been widespread used in information
communication. However, the widely used PKE schemes, such as RSA have
been threatened by quantum attack. Then it becomes important to construct
PKE scheme against quantum attack.
Okamoto et al. [1] constructed the first quantum PKE scheme based
on subset-sum problem, whose public-key is computed from the private-key
with Shor’s algorithm for finding discrete logarithm, though the private-key,
public-key, plaintext and ciphertext are all classical. In [2], a quantum PKE
is constructed based on a hard problem QSCDff , which has been proved
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to be one with bounded information theoretic security [3]. By using single-
qubit rotations, Nikolopoulos [4] proposed a quantum PKE with classical
private-key and quantum public-key. Based on quantum encryption, Gao et
al. [5] presented a quantum PKE with symmetric keys, with two qubits from
a Bell state serving as the public-key and the private-key, respectively. Pan
and Yang [6] constructed a quantum PKE scheme with information theoretic
security. All these quantum PKEs above are classical bits oriented. However,
quantum messages also need to be encrypted in some cases. Though quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) plus quantum one-time pad (QOTP) can finish
the task of encrypting quantum messages, it needs some preshared keys in
the implementation of QKD. This paper explores the asymmetric scheme of
this task, and propose a quantum-message-oriented PKE.
McEliece public-key encryption scheme [7] is based on coding theory and
its security relies on the difficulty of solving a NP-complete (NPC) problem.
Though the scheme is a classical PKE scheme, it is believed that it can resist
quantum attack. Based on its construction, the researchers begin to construct
PKE scheme in quantum world, for the purpose of encryption of quantum
messages. Yang [8] proposed the first quantum analogue of McEliece PKE,
in which the public-key and private-key are classical, however it can encrypt
quantum messages. Later in 2010, we extend it and present the definition of
induced trapdoor one-way transformation (OWT), then construct a frame-
work of quantum PKE based on the induced trapdoor OWT. The quantum
McEliece PKE proposed in [8] can be seen as a special case of the quantum
PKE framework. In 2012, Fujita [9] also proposed a quantum analogue of
McEliece PKE based on quantum coding theory, and its security also re-
lies on the difficulty of solving a NPC problem. This scheme also uses the
classical keys and can encrypt quantum messages.
This paper studies the security of the quantum McEliece PKE scheme
which is proposed in Ref.[8, 10], and then focuses on the improvement to it.
2. Quantum public-key encryption
Firstly, we define quantum public-key encryption(QPKE) as follows. With-
out loss of generality, the definition is presented for the encryption of quan-
tum messages (The classical messages can be seen as a special case).
Definition 1: A quantum public-key encryption scheme is described by
a triplet (G, E ,D), where
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1. G is the polynomial time quantum key-generation algorithm. On input
1n, G outputs (e, d) in polynomial time, where e is a public key, d is a
secret-key, and n is a security parameter.
2. E ,D are the polynomial time quantum encryption/decryption algo-
rithms. They satisfy this condition: For every n-qubit message σ,
every polynomial poly(n), and all sufficiently large n,
F (D(E(σ, e), d), σ) > 1− 1/poly(n),
where F (σ1, σ2) denotes the fidelity of two states σ1, σ2.
Next, we present the security definition of QPKE.
Definition 2: A quantum public-key encryption scheme is computation-
ally (information-theoretically) secure, if for every polynomial-size (unlimited-
size) quantum circuit family Cn, every positive polynomial p(.), all sufficiently
large n, and any two quantum messages σ, σ′ ∈ HM , it holds that∣∣Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ′)) = 1]∣∣ < 1
p(n)
,
where E is a polynomial time quantum encryption algorithm and G is a
polynomial time quantum algorithm for generating public-keys.
3. Quantum McEliece public-key encryption scheme
3.1. Some notations
Suppose ρ =
∑
m∈{0,1}k
∑
m′∈{0,1}k αmm′ |m〉〈m
′| and G is a k × n matrix,
then we denote
ρ ◦G =
∑
m
∑
m′
αmm′ |mG〉〈m
′G|,
where mG is the multiplication of the vector m and matrix G modular 2.
Suppose x is arbitrary vector in {0, 1}k, then we denote
ρ∔ x =
∑
m∈{0,1}k
∑
m′∈{0,1}k
αmm′ |m+ x〉〈m
′ + x|,
where m+ x is the bitwise addition of m and x modular 2.
Suppose a matrix M is a n×n invertible matrix, then denote M−1 as the
inverse matrix of M .
Suppose a matrixM is a k×n (k < n) matrix and it is full row rank, then
it has Moore-Penrose inverse. Denote M− as one of Moore-Penrose inverses
of M satisfying MM− = I (I is identity matrix).
3
3.2. Scheme [8]
Quantum McEliece public key encryption scheme is firstly proposed in
Ref.[8]. This scheme will be briefly introduced before our analysis and im-
provement.
The quantum key-generation algorithm is the same as classical McEliece
PKE protocol [7]: Suppose G is a k×n generator matrix of a [n, k, d] Goppa
code, G′ = SGP , here S is a k×k invertible matrix and P is an n×n permu-
tation matrix. We choose (G′, t), t ≤ ⌊d−1
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⌋ as the public-key and (S,G, P )
as the private-key. Let H is the check matrix of Goppa code satisfying
GHT = 0.
Alice selects a random number r of weight ≤ t, and uses Bob’s public-key
G′ with r to encrypt a k-qubit state ρ. This encryption can be shown by the
density as follows.
ρ→ ρ ◦G′ → ρ ◦G′ ∔ r.
Denote ρ ◦ G′ ∔ r , ρc, the ρc is the quantum ciphertext. The above trans-
formation is feasible. The reason will be shown later.
Bob uses his private-key s = (S,G, P ) to decrypt the state ρc coming
from Alice: Firstly he computes the state ρc ◦ P
−1(=ρ ◦ SG ∔ rP−1) and
extract the value of rP−1; Then he computes ρc ◦P
−1∔ rP−1(=ρ ◦SG), and
can further obtain the state
((ρc ◦ P
−1 ∔ rP−1) ◦G−) ◦ S−1,
which is equal to ((ρ ◦ SG) ◦ G−) ◦ S−1ρ = (ρ ◦ S) ◦ S−1 = ρ. Note that,
G− is a Moore-Penrose inverse of G. So G− is a n × k(n > k) binary
matrix. According to Proposition 5 in the appendix, the transformation
σ ◦G− is infeasible physically for arbitrary n-qubit state σ. However, ρ ◦SG
is a special subclass of all n-qubit states, which is related to G. So the
computation (ρ ◦ SG) ◦ G− is feasible physically. This will be shown in the
following concrete scheme, see Eq.(4).
Next, we show the encryption/decryption algorithms in the Dirac form,
which is a more understandable way.
Denote the k-qubit state ρ as
∑
m αm|m〉. Then, this encryption can be
described in the following three steps
|r〉
∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉 → |r〉
∑
m
αm|m〉|mG
′〉 → |r〉
∑
m
αm|m⊕mG
′G′−〉|mG′〉
→ |r〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉, (1)
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where the matrix G′− is a generalized inverse matrix of G′. Because G′ is a
full row rank matrix, there exists G′− that satisfies G′G′− = Ik. This is the
condition that one can get
∑
m αm|mG
′〉 from
∑
m αm|m〉. Alice sends the
cipher state
∑
m αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉 to Bob.
Bob uses his private-key s = (S,G, P ) to decrypt the state coming from
Alice,
|s〉
∑
m
αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉|0〉|0〉 → |s〉
∑
m
αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉|(mG′ ⊕ r)P−1〉|0〉
→ |s〉
∑
m
αm|0〉|(mG
′ ⊕ r)P−1〉|0〉 = |s〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ rP
−1〉|0〉
→ |s〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ rP
−1〉|(mSG⊕ rP−1)HT 〉
= |s〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ rP
−1〉|rP−1HT 〉, (2)
then measures the second register to get rP−1HT , and find rP−1 via the
fast decoding algorithm of the Goppa code generated by G. Bob carries out
the following transformation on the quantum state
∑
m αm|mSG ⊕ rP
−1〉
according to the value of rP−1,
|rP−1〉
∑
m
αm|mSG⊕ rP
−1〉 → |rP−1〉
∑
m
αm|mSG〉. (3)
Then he computes
|s〉
∑
m
αm|mSG〉|0〉|0〉
→ |s〉
∑
m
αm|mSG〉|mSGG
−〉|0〉 = |s〉
∑
m
αm|mSG〉|mS〉|0〉
→ |s〉
∑
m
αm|0〉|mS〉|0〉
→ |s〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mS〉|mSS
−1〉 = |s〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|mS〉|m〉
→ |s〉|0〉|0〉
∑
m
αm|m〉. (4)
Finally, the quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉 is obtained.
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3.3. Analysis
Induced trapdoor one-way transformation (OWT) has been defined in
Ref. [10]. The above protocol satisfies the framework of QPKE based on
induced trapdoor OWT. Let g(m, r) = 0 and f(m, r) = mG′ ⊕ r in the
induced trapdoor OWT. Here g(m, r) is a constant function, then the en-
cryption transformation can be simplified as
Ufg(r) =
∑
m
|0〉〈m| ⊗ |mG′ ⊕ r〉〈0|.
The decryption transformation is
Dfg(s) =
∑
r,m
|r(f, s)〉〈0| ⊗ |m〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈f(m, r)|.
where r(f, s) denotes a function that is relative to f, s.
• Firstly, we analyze its security while encrypting classical messages.
The quantum McEliece PKE scheme can be used to encrypt classical
message. In this case, the quantum McEliece PKE would degenerate to the
corresponding classical PKE. The classical McEliece PKE has been studied
for more than thirty years in modern cryptography, and is believed to be
secure. Thus, our scheme is secure while encrypting classical messages.
Ref.[9] believes our scheme is insecure when encrypting classical messages.
Though the McEliece PKE has not been reduced to NP-complete problem,
here we discuss the difficult from a new view when attacking the ciphertext
mG′ ⊕ r. Attacking cipher mG′ ⊕ r is equivalent to attacking m ⊕ rG′−.
Now,we show the difficulty of decoding m⊕ rG′−.
As it is in McEliece PKE scheme, we know G′ = SGP , where S, P are
both invertible matrices, G is generator matrix of Goppa code and is full
row rank, so G′ is also full row rank, and then it has Moore-Penrose inverse.
Suppose G
′−
1 is one of Moore-Penrose inverses of G
′ satisfying G′G
′−
1 = I. In
fact, G
′−
1 can be obtained by solving the linear equations G
′X = I. Then all
the Moore-Penrose inverses of G′ can be written as the form
G′− = G
′−
1 ⊕ U ⊕G
′−
1 G
′U,
where U is any n × k binary matrix. It can be verified that G′G′− = I.
In classical McEliece PKE scheme, the cipher c and plaintext m satisfy the
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relation c = mG′ ⊕ r, where r is a binary row vector of weight t. Suppose
Eve finds another Moore-Penrose inverse of G′, denoted as G
′−
2 , then he can
compute cG
′−
2 = m⊕rG
′−
2 . DenoteG
′−
2 = (e1 · · · ek), where each ei is a binary
column vector. Then cG
′−
2 can be represented as (m1⊕r·e1), · · · , (mk⊕r·ek).
If each column ei of G
′−
2 has more zeros (it means the Hamming weight of
ei is small enough), r · ei would equal to 0 with large probability, then its
i−th bit mi⊕ r · ei would reveal the i−th bit of original plaintext with large
probability. Notice that ei = gi ⊕ (I ⊕ G
′−
1 G
′)ui, where gi and ui are the
i−th column of G
′−
1 and U separately. Here gi and I ⊕ G
′−
1 G are known,
but ui is unknown. Now Eve have to face a problem: finding ui, such that
gi⊕ (I ⊕G
′−
1 G
′)ui has weight smaller than a given value. This is just a LPN
problem, which is a NP-complete problem.
Remark 1: This problem can be seen from another view. I ⊕ G
′−
1 G
′ is
a n × n matrix, and gi, ui are two n × 1 vectors, but ui is unknown. So
the above problem can be restated as follow: how to select some columns of
I ⊕ G
′−
1 G
′, such that their summation is closest to vector gi? This is just a
closest vector problem (CVP), which is a NP-hard problem.
We have tried numerical experiment following the above attack, and it
seems that this kind of attack is invalid. This attack is reduced to an optimal
problem (CVP): finding ui, such as gi ⊕ (I ⊕G
′−
1 G
′)ui (notice that it equals
ei) has weight smaller than a given value. Suppose the parameters n =
1024, k = 524, t = 50 in the McEliece PKC scheme. Firstly, because ui has
21024 choices, both the exhaustive search and random search are not realistic.
While choosing some small parameters such as n = 60, k = 30, the exhaustive
search can reduce the weight of ei to 1 with probability 2%, and the random
search may be slightly better. With the greedy search, we obtain ei of weight
225 on average. In this case, Pr[r · ei = 0] ≈ 0.5 + 0.1 × 10
−13, here r is
a n-bit random vector of weight t = 50. Thus, the attack presented here is
invalid.
• Secondly, we strictly prove the relationship between the security of quan-
tum PKE protocols and that of its classical counterpart.
Theorem 1: The quantum McEliece PKE is at least as secure as classical
McEliece PKE protocol.
Proof: Suppose there is a quantum algorithm A, which can efficiently
transform the cipher state
∑
m αm|mG
′⊕r〉 into quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉.
In order to decrypt arbitrary classical cipher m0G
′ ⊕ r0, we firstly prepare a
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quantum state |m0G
′⊕ r0〉. Then, the quantum state |m0G
′⊕ r0〉 is an input
to the quantum algorithm A, and will be transformed into the quantum state
|m0〉. Finally, the classical message m0 is obtained via measuring the output
quantum state |m0〉. Thus, if there is an attack to quantum McEliece PKE,
there would be an attack to classical McEliece PKE. Therefore, quantum
McEliece PKE is at least as secure as classical McEliece PKE protocol. 
Since the functions f(m, r) and g(m, r) are classical functions, finding
the trapdoor s is a classical computational problem. Thus, the security of
QPKE protocol based on induced trapdoor OWT depends on the onewayness
of corresponding classical trapdoor one-way function.
Now we can arrive at the following conclusion.
The security of a QPKE protocol based on induced trapdoor OWQT is one
between that of corresponding classical PKE and the onewayness of related
classical one-way function. In other words, the security of a QPKE given
above is not stronger than the onewayness of related classical trapdoor one-
way function, and is not weaker than the security of its classical counterparts.
• Finally, we analyze its security from the aspect of attack.
The attacker can have two different strategies: 1) attacking the secret key
from the public key; 2) attacking the ciphertext
∑
m αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉.
If the attacker adopts the first strategy, the difficulty is the same as that
of attacking the classical McEliece PKE, because the quantum PKE scheme
uses the same key-generating algorithm as its classical counterpart.
If the attacker adopts the second strategy, we should analyze what can
be extracted from the ciphertext
∑
m αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉.
Theorem 2: The strategy 2) is inefficient when attacking the ciphertext
of quantum McEliece PKE scheme.
Proof: Because k × n matrix G′ is public and full rank k (k < n), the
attacker can compute its generalized inverse matrix G′−, which is a n × k
matrix. Thus, the attacker can perform the following processing on the
ciphertext.∑
m
αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|mG
′ ⊕ r〉|m⊕ rG′−〉
→ |r ⊕ rG′−G′〉
∑
m
αm|m⊕ rG
′−〉. (5)
Then, the attacker can measurement the first register, and obtain the value
of r(I⊕G′−G′). In addition, he can also obtain a new ciphertext
∑
m αm|m⊕
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rG′−〉, which can be written asX(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉 or
∑
m αm|(mG
′⊕r)G′−〉.
From the following two propositions, the proof can be finished.
Proposition 1: Given the values of r(I⊕G′−G′) and I⊕G′−G′, solving
the value of r is a LPN problem.
Proof: Now we know the attacker can obtain the values of r(I ⊕G′−G′)
and I ⊕ G′−G′. Because G′(I ⊕ G′−G′) = G′ ⊕ G′ = 0 and G′ 6= 0, it can
be inferred that n × n matrix I ⊕ G′−G′ is not full rank. So only a little
information about r cannot be computed from the values of r(I ⊕ G′−G′)
and I ⊕G′−G′. However, the value of rG′− is still hard to compute. Denote
v = r(I ⊕ G′−G′). Then, computing the value of rG′− is a NPC problem:
given the values of v,G′, r is a random binary vector, how to compute the
value of rG′− from the equation v = r⊕ (rG′−)G′? It is just a LPN problem
which has been discussed above. 
Now we know the attacker can transform the ciphertext
∑
m αm|mG
′⊕r〉
into
∑
m αm|(mG
′⊕r)G′−〉. However, it does not hold for any quantum state∑
m αm|m〉. In other words, the transformation
∑
m αm|m〉 →
∑
m αm|mH〉
may be physically infeasible. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2: The state X(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉 is unrelated with the
plaintext
∑
m αm|m〉, from the view of fidelity.
Proof: According to Fujita’s analysis [9], X basis measurement on the
two states X(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉 and
∑
m αm|m〉 can result a same statistical
probability. This is obviously correct since the two states differ only in some
bit-flips [12]. So it is expected that the attacker may obtain some information
about the quantum messages by quantum measurement onX(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉.
Though there exists a vulnerability in quantum McEliece PKE, it should
be stressed that similarity of these two statesX(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉 and
∑
m αm|m〉
is described by the fidelity of them:
F (e) =
∣∣∣∣∣(∑
m
α∗m〈m|) |X(e)| (
∑
n
αn|n〉)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
m,n
α∗mαn〈m|X(e)|n〉
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
m
α∗mαm⊕e
∣∣∣∣∣ , (6)
where e = rG′− is a random string depending on the error r. It can be seen
that F (e) may equals to any value from 0 to 1, then, generally speaking,
identical probability distributions do not means identical states. 
Remark 2: The attack to the state X(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉 can also be ana-
lyzed from information theory. According to Holevo theorem [12], the quan-
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tum measurement on X(r1G
′−
1 )
∑
m αm|m〉 can obtain at most k-bit infor-
mation, but
∑
m αm|m〉 has 2
k amplitudes αm. Suppose each amplitude is
accurate to l decimal places, then each αm can be seen as l-bit complex
number which has both real and image parts, so it is necessary to obtain
2l×2k-bit information for determining an unknown state
∑
m αm|m〉. It can
be seen that even Alice encrypts the same quantum state polynomial times,
the attacker can obtain at most a polynomial-bits information. It is still hard
for her to determine the state
∑
m αm|m〉.
4. Double-encryption scheme
4.1. Scheme
As stated by Fujita [9], the vulnerability of quantum McEliece PKE is
due to the fact that our PKC introduces no phase encryption. In this section,
we propose an improved variant of the quantum McEliece PKE scheme using
double-encryption technique.
The encryption is briefly stated as follows. The quantum McEliece PKE
is used twice, however, the second encryption uses the different parameters
from the first.
1. Alice uses two pairs of public-keys (G′1, t1) and (G
′
2, t2). She firstly uses
the first public-key (G′1, t1) to encrypt the k-qubit message
∑
m αm|m〉,
and obtain a n-qubit state
∑
m αm|mG
′
1 ⊕ r1〉.
2. Then she performs an Hadamard transformation H⊗n on this state and
obtain H⊗n
∑
m αm|mG
′
1 ⊕ r1〉 =
∑
m αm
∑
k(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)|k〉.
3. Finally she uses the second public-key (G′2, t2) to encrypt the n-qubit
quantum state H⊗n
∑
m αm|mG
′
1 ⊕ r1〉, and obtains a n
′-qubit quan-
tum state, which is the ciphertext of the improved scheme. The final
ciphertext is as follow:∑
m
αm
∑
k
(−1)k·(mG
′
1
⊕r1)|kG′2 ⊕ r2〉
=
∑
k
[∑
m
αm(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)
]
|kG′2 ⊕ r2〉. (7)
Bob receives the ciphertext, and performs the following decryption pro-
cess.
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1. Bob uses the second private-key to decrypt the received n′-qubit quan-
tum cipher state, and obtain a n-qubit state
∑
m αm
∑
k(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)|k〉.
2. Then he performs an Hadamard transformation H⊗n on the n-qubit
state.
3. Finally he uses the first private-key to decrypt and obtain the k-qubit
message.
4.2. Analysis
Firstly, it should be noticed that, our scheme is more simple than the
scheme proposed by Fujita [9]. Fujita’s scheme is constructed based on quan-
tum error-correction code, which has the ability to correct quantum errors.
However, the encoding in our scheme uses classical error-correction code and
cannot correct quantum errors, and has less redundance, so its encoding
circuit needs less ancillary qubits and is more simple than Fujita’s scheme.
Now, let’s consider the security of double-encryption scheme. From the
view of Alice, the attacker can obtain the following quantum state by per-
forming a unitary about G′−2 ,
X(r2G
′−
2 )
∑
k
[∑
m
αm(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)
]
|k〉.
Then he performs H⊗n and obtains the following state
H⊗nX(r2G
′−
2 )
∑
k
[∑
m
αm(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)
]
|k〉
= Z(r2G
′−
2 )H
⊗n
∑
k
[∑
m
αm(−1)
k·(mG′
1
⊕r1)
]
|k〉
= Z(r2G
′−
2 )
∑
m
αm|mG
′
1 ⊕ r1〉
=
∑
m
αm(−1)
(r2G
′−
2
)·(mG′
1
⊕r1)|mG′1 ⊕ r1〉, (8)
and then perform a transformation with relative to G′−1 , and finally obtains
a state
X(r1G
′−
1 )
∑
m
αm(−1)
(r2G
′−
2
)·(mG′
1
⊕r1)|m〉. (9)
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During the above process, the attacker can obtain the values of r2(I ⊕
G′−2 G
′
2),r1(I ⊕ G
′−
1 G
′
1), I ⊕ G
′−
2 G
′
2 and I ⊕ G
′−
1 G
′
1. However, he still can-
not obtain the values of r1, r2. The reason is the same as the analysis in
Section 3.3.
Then, whether one can extract some information about the plaintext∑
m αm|m〉 from the state in Eq.(9)?
In the original quantum McEliece PKE scheme, the attacker can trans-
form the ciphertext and obtain the state X(rG′−)
∑
m αm|m〉. By comparing
this state with the original quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉, they differs only
some bit-flip errors. Thus, the original encryption scheme introduces only
bit-flip errors, however, bit-flip errors can be seen as phase errors in conju-
gate space because of HXH = Z. This is so called vulnerability discussed
in [9].
When it is modified with double-encryption scheme, the attacker can ob-
tain the quantum state expressed in Eq.(9). By comparing this state with
quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉, both bit-flip errors and phase errors are in-
troduced. Thus, whether it is seen from the conjugate space or not, the two
types of errors exist simultaneously. Then the vulnerability is eliminated.
The detail arguments are as follows.
Theorem 3: The double-encryption scheme is more secure than the
original quantum PKE scheme in Sec.3.
Proof: Because the attacker can transfer the quantum cipher into the
state Z(r2G
′−
2 )
∑
m αm|mG
′
1⊕ r1〉 in Eq.(9), with regard to the attacker, the
encryption operator can be written as
U(r1, r2) = Z(r2G
′−
2 )
∑
m
|mG′1 ⊕ r1〉〈m, 0 · · ·0|
= Z(r2G
′−
2 )X(r1)
∑
m
|mG′1〉〈m, 0 · · ·0|
= Z(r2G
′−
2 )X(r1)V, (10)
where the operator V =
∑
m |mG
′
1〉〈m0| is independent of the two error
vectors r1, r2. Given the public key G
′
1, the operator V is a constant operator.
Remark 3: As is known from Refs.[13, 14], the encryption operator in
private quantum channel can be written as U(a, b) = Z(b)X(a), where a, b are
chosen randomly, and its security depends on the randomness of a, b. Because
V in Eq.(10) is a constant operator, the encryption operator U(r1, r2) can be
seen as a special kind of private quantum channel, where the difference lies
in that the weight of random vectors r1, r2 is bounded by t1, t2 separately.
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In the original quantum McEliece PKE scheme, the encryption opera-
tor can be seen as U ′(r1, r2) = Z(r2)X(r1G
′−
1 ), where r2 ≡ 0. The ran-
dom bits of r1, r2 in the double-encryption scheme is twice more than that
in the original quantum McEliece PKE scheme. In other words, attack-
ing the state U(r1, r2)
∑
m αm|m〉 is more difficult than attacking the state
U ′(r1, 0)
∑
m αm|m〉. Thus, the double-encryption scheme can improve the
security of our quantum PKE scheme. 
From the above proof, one can informally conclude that
To achieve the same security as the original quantum McEliece PKE
scheme in Sec.3, the double-encryption scheme requires about half of the key-
length than the original scheme.
Proposition 3: Multiple use of the double-encryption scheme will de-
crease its security.
Proof: In the double-encryption scheme (usually let the parameters k =
524, n = 1024, n′ = 2n = 2048), the length of ciphertext is expanded about
4 times (n′/k ≈ 4), however, the bits of random key are expanded only 3
times ((n′ + n)/n = 3). So, the ratio between the bit-length of the random
key and the length of ciphertext would decrease approaching zero when the
double-encryption scheme are used several times. That is, with respect to
the length of ciphertext, the amount of key is reduced, then it means the
security will be worse. Thus, the security will decrease when using multiple
times of the double-encryption scheme. 
Remark 4: Though the double-encryption scheme is more secure than the
once-encryption scheme, it is enough to adopt once-encryption scheme (the
scheme is given in Sec.3) in some low level security scenario.
Finally, it is worth to noticed that, in private quantum channel, the ran-
dom numbers r1, r2 are not locally generated, and are preshared keys. How-
ever, in double-encryption scheme, r1, r2 are locally selected, and are random
numbers which are used in the encryption only once. In addition, accord-
ing to our scheme, two identical quantum messages may be encrypted into
two different ciphertexts since the different random numbers r1, r2 are used
every time. Thus, there are only one chance when attacking the ciphertext
of a quantum message through quantum measurement, in other words, the
message can be encrypted several times without loss of security.
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5. Discussions
There has been several attack to classical McEliece PKE. However, an at-
tack to classical McEliece PKE does not mean an attack to quantumMcEliece
PKE. There are several kinds of attack to classical McEliece PKE, such as
Korzhik-Turkin attack [15], message-resend attack and related-message at-
tack [16]. Since the detail of Korzhik-Turkin attack has not been given till
now, the efficiency of this attack is still an open problem. Because iterative
decoding algorithm is used in the Korzhik-Turkin attack, and quantum state
cannot be reused, it fails when attacking quantum McEliece PKE. Though
classical McEliece PKE has to be improved to prevent message-resend attack
and related-message attack [17], these attacks also fail while facing the quan-
tum McEliece PKE protocol. Therefore, quantum McEliece PKE is more
secure than classical McEliece PKE protocol.
Our quantum PKE schemes are designed to encrypt quantum message∑
m αm|m〉. However, if we consider the number r involved as classical mes-
sage encrypted, this kind of QPKE scheme can also be regarded as ‘quantum
envelope’ for classical message transmission. In addition, since the attacks to
classical McEliece PKE, such as Korzhik-Turkin attack [15], message-resend
attack and related-message attack [16], fail to attack quantumMcEliece PKE,
it is probably more secure to transmit classical information via quantum
McEliece PKE than that via classical McEliece PKE.
Actually, the quantum McEliece PKE scheme has ever been presented
originally in a conference paper (see Ref.[8]). This paper investigates that
original scheme and develops double-encryption technique to improve its se-
curity. Though we only construct the quantum version of McEliece PKE, the
method here can also be extended to construct quantum versions of other
classical PKE schemes. The details are presented in Ref.[10]. It is worth
to notice that some of the schemes in Ref.[10] do not have post-quantum
security.
The other quantum McEliece PKE proposed by Fujita [9] is based on
quantum coding. The security of both Fujita’s and our schemes depends on
the difficulty of solving NPC problem. Fujita [9] pointed out a vulnerabil-
ity of our scheme in Ref.[8], however, it has been improved in this paper.
Ref.[9] argued that the PKE scheme in Ref.[8] is insecure while encrypting
classical messages. Here we have clarified it in Sec.3.3. In addition, we
would like to mention that it is sufficient to adopt the original PKE scheme
proposed in Ref.[8] in some low-level security scenario besides encrypting
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classical messages. Finally, we would argue that, our scheme is more simple
than Fujita’s scheme. The reason is as follows: Fujita’s scheme is based on
quantum error correction code and the encoding can correct quantum errors,
while our scheme is based on classical error correction code and does not
have the ability of quantum error correction; This means correcting quan-
tum error is not the necessary functionality in quantum public-key cryp-
tosystems; Our scheme removes this redundant functionality, and makes the
encoding/decoding more simple.
6. Conclusions
Quantum version of McEliece PKE is analyzed and is at least as secure
as their classical counterparts, and, at the same time, are also shown that
they cannot be more secure than related one-way function. We also suggest
double-encryption scheme to improve the security of the QPKE protocol,
and analyze its security would decrease while multiply applying the double-
encryption scheme.
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Appendix
Ref.[1] introduces a constant-weight coding algorithm which can encode
each k-bit messages m to a n-bit string w(m) = e1e2 · · · en of the same weight
t, and different messages has different codes. This algorithm can be modified
to be a quantum encoding alogrithm which implements the transformation∑
m
αm|m〉 →
∑
m
αm|w(m)〉. (.1)
The number of qubits changes after the above transformation. It is worth
to explain why this quantum transformation is valid. Because the encoding
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algorithm m→ w(m) is a reversible computing, and both the two-way com-
puting can be implemented efficiently, the following two steps of quantum
computing can also be implemented efficiently:∑
m
αm|m〉|0〉 →
∑
m
αm|m〉|w(m)〉
→ |0〉
∑
m
αm|w(m)〉.
Thus, the quantum encoding alogrithm can be written as the Eq.(.1). How-
ever, this is not valid for general computation. We prove it in the following
propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 4: Quantum transformation
∑
m αm|w(m)〉 →
∑
m αm|w(m)H〉
is infeasible physically, where H is n× k (n > k) binary matrix, and w(m) ∈
{0, 1}n is a constant-weight code of m.
Clearly, the computing w(m) → w(m)H can be implemented by a poly-
nomial size classical circuit. However, the reverse computing cannot been
finished, because the n × k(n > k) matrix H does not have right inverse.
Thus, we cannot express the quantum transformation
∑
m αm|w(m)〉 →∑
m αm|w(m)H〉.
Next, we give a strict demonstration.
Proof: The computing w(m) → w(m)H, ∀m, changes n-bit string into
k-bit string. Because k < n, it can be think as this: for arbitrary n-bit string
w(m), its last n − k-bit information is erasured into zeroes and the former
k bits is changed to w(m)H . This means, there exist a n × (n − k) binary
matrix A, such as
w(m)[H|A] = [w(m)H|0 · · ·0], for all n−bit constant weight code. (.2)
Thus, w(m)A = 0 · · ·0, ∀m. Then there exists a n × (n − k) binary matrix
A such that, each column of A (denoted as aj) is orthogonal with arbitrary
w(m). Because w(m) is a n-bit constant-weight code of weight t (t < n), any
t elements of any aj is summed to 0(mod2).
If t is even, any aj must be either all-zero vector or all-one vector; If t
is odd, aj must be all-zero vector. Thus, when t is even, each column of A
must be either all-zero vector or all-one vector; When t is odd, each column
of A must be all-zero vector. No matter which condition happens, the n× n
matrix [H|A] cannot be unitary. So, it is infeasible to physically implement
the quantum transformation
∑
m αm|w(m)〉 →
∑
m αm|w(m)H〉.
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The result can be extended to the general case.
Proposition 5: Quantum transformation
∑
m αm|m〉 →
∑
m αm|mH〉
is infeasible physically, where H is a n × k (n > k) binary matrix, and
m ∈ {0, 1}n.
Proof: The proof is similar to Proposition 4. In the same way, there
exist a n × (n − k) binary matrix A, such as mA = 0 · · ·0, ∀m ∈ {0, 1}n.
Then the matrix A is the all-zero matrix, and the n×n matrix [H|A] cannot
be unitary. So, it is infeasible to physically implement the quantum trans-
formation
∑
m
αm|m〉 →
∑
m
αm|mH〉. In other words, the transformation
T =
∑
m |
n−k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0, mH〉〈m| is infeasible in physical implementation.
In fact, when part of the amplitudes αm, m ∈ {0, 1}
n are set to zeroes,
Proposition 5 would degenerate to Proposition 4.
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